Spineless in the Hague

The Hague is a place famous for dealing with some of the most intractable issues of the 20th Century. Whether the International Criminal Court, set up to deal with war crimes, or the Hague Convention to establish a code for prisoners of war, principled men and women have endeavoured to establish a set of values to improve how our world operates.

In sharp contrast to these famous examples, at the Nato summit held in Hague, values and principles were conspicuous by their absence. It is not easy to find the right adjective[s] to describe the behaviours of European heads of state. The lack of ease is because there are too many to choose from, not too few. After some thought, hapless and servile are the ones I have chosen.

Hapless because it was clear that European leaders had already let the NATO summit become a fealty fest, thanks to the statement from oleaginous and obsequious Mark Rutte. Sounding more like a Trump PR aide, instead of the Secretary General of NATO, his broadcasting that the US President would get a big win at the summit. was naive at best and posterior licking at worst. It allowed one member of the NATO alliance to determine the agenda for the whole summit, and subsequently the press and communication strategies that flowed from it.

There is no doubt that the 5% spend on defence commitments was a key US policy goal, and a longstanding charge from Trump that Europe has been living off US defence obligations for too long. And whilst there is some truth in that charge, it is now a historical one, as Poland and the Baltic countries are already spending up near 5% and most other NATO members with exception of Spain, are now a minimum of 2.5% and growing year on year.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has concentrated the minds of European countries and NATO members alike on the need for greater emphasis on defence against the Putin regime. This is most apparent in those countries previously part of the Soviet bloc, as well as in previously neutral Finland and Sweden who joined NATO in 2024. Further west, spending in the Benelux countries and in the UK has increased significantly, despite the political pressure that has put these Governments.

That feeling of existential threat to Europe has been demonstrated by continued support from European countries to Ukraine in terms of weapons, moral support and sheltering of refugees. and whilst these have often been slower and less than promised, Europe has made a significant contribution to supporting Ukraine. Strong statements from Merz, the German Chancellor, stand in stark contrast to the seemly half-hearted responses of Olaf Scholz.

On top of that welcome collaboration between NATO countries and bilateral arrangements such as that to manufacture weapons, for example, between UK and Ukraine, were crowded out of the self-congratulatory paean of praise from Rutte to Trump. And let us remind ourselves, that the Secy General is there to serve the ALL the members of NATO, not just one signatory.

And that brings me to the second adjective, servile. Having set up NATO agreement on a platter for Trump, it had the feel of vassal states lauding the Emperor, anxious to avoid anything that displeases them.

All the more astonishing after giving up in advance of any discussion, the 5% defence spend rate, the lack of pushback on seeking a binding agreement and endorsement from Trump on article 5, the article gives a country the rationale for joining, namely that an attack of one Nato member is an attack on Nato AS A WHOLE, was probably the largest display of spinelessness by European leaders in Nato since the Srebrinica massacres in 1995.

That reluctance to stand up for the central purpose of your country being part of a defensive and protective military alliance empowers Trump in his strategy to undermine NATO and attack the European Union. It is telling that he refused to give a commitment to the rules of a club that US was a founding member of. It must cause anxiety among the smaller members of Nato, such as the Baltic countries.

And that subordination by individual sovereign states to the personal agenda of Trump, meant that a summit of a defensive alliance established after WW2 to resist Soviet expansion and threats to Europe, was unable and unwilling to make an unequivocal statement condemning the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, and as a consequence Ukrainian membership of Nato is increasingly unlikely.

Except for statements from the German Chancellor, there was little comfort for Ukraine from the summit, for Putin, it merely confirmed that Trump will not do anything to stop Russian aggression. What would happen if Russia made an incursion into Estonia, using the ‘excuse’ that Russians living there have been subject to systematic attacks by individual Estonians who have been encouraged by Government anti -Russian statements? Russia has used such a tactic before, not least in Ukraine.

Clearly Estonia would trigger Article 5, and other NATO countries, especially Poland and UK, which already have bilateral defence agreements, would be obliged to help defend it. But would the US get involved, or would Trump promise a call with Putin to sort it as the only action required?

The very fact that such a question could arise to be asked brings uncertainty to members and defeats the purpose of being part of a collective security alliance, which is to offer certainty. In effect, the rest of Nato cannot and indeed should not rely on the US.

So why did it turn out this way? I am sure that the arch pragmatists will argue that this was a tactical position to manage the Trump tariff threat, and by flattering him with praise, might make him more accommodating on tariffs. To some extent, this tactic was adopted by Macron and Starmer in their White House visits, in response to the humiliation of Zelensky, and it worked. Yet the management of a bilateral meeting is quite different from the dynamics of a summit. It is a misguided tactic that is wrong in principle and in practice.

Trump wants a weak Europe with little economic independence, a passive market dependent on US goods, a classic extractive relationship, whilst he concentrates on taking on China. Trump and key parts of his team are Europhobes; they dislike the statist regulatory rules-based approach of the EU, so flattery is not going to change their and Trump’s goals.

Also, the Atlanticist agreement that created NATO, sustained the West through the cold war and beyond the break-up of the Soviet Union, who fought together in what was termed the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was what some would call liberal internationalism, others would call liberal imperialism. Either way, that ideology is now longer relevant in the eyes of Trump, where ensuring America is top dog in the battle for supremacy over China. It is the only foreign policy show in town.

Europe and NATO European leaders need to understand that the ‘art of the deal’ really means the house always wins- for Trump, negotiation is about imposition. Tariffs are a naked exercise of power, a world where US interest determines the level of partnership, which for them means telling their allies nicely. And surely in Europe of all continents, where smug forebearers of European leaders thought they could tame the Hitler, flatter Mussolini, or manage Stalin the failure of these so-called strategies are laid bare in history books. It seems many European leaders in Nato have forgotten their history and how to deal with bullies.

So, how can these European leaders of NATO member countries try and salvage something from this debacle and display of powerlessness? How can they build some resilience and push back?

Europe is punch drunk and still trying to come to terms with the unilateral overturning of what has been a common Nato approach. However, it should have come as no surprise, this was well telegraphed in advance of Trump’s victory. Therefore, Europe needs to come to terms with it, stop bemoaning the change, and starting to take control over it’s own destiny. That brings its own tensions on whether the EU should lead on foreign policy and brings the contentious issue of a possible European Army. These are huge issues, and clearly Europe is not in position to have these conversations in the near future. But there are more prosaic and practical actions it could take that would find favour with most EU/Nato members.

Well, it could start how and where Eurpoean NATO members choose to spend their increased share of defence spending. In his facile ‘daddy’s here comments Rutte was implying that this new largesse would fuel US defence contractors growth. European countries should resist that and use this expenditure to invest in the innovation of new weapons systems in Europe, for European customers.

First and foremost, encourage production of ammunition in European factories rather than purchasing from America. The very fact that all Nato countries use standard ammunition for rifles enable upscaling of production relatively simple. Building on and expanding existing initiatives of collaboration on fighter jet and armoured vehicle developments could be another way, especially now that Sweden is a member of Nato.

These joint initiatives, driven by new levels of spending could drive economic growth in an otherwise sluggish EU economy through dual use adaptation. For example, look how Ukrainian ingenuity in drone development could have a huge commercial and social potential, as well as give EU Nato countries real time experiences on the production and testing of the next generation of drone, robot, and AI armaments, all of which will have civilian and commercial spin offs.

And it is through this collaboration that European Nato countries can start support and learn from the Ukrainians, and at the same time modernise its own armed forces, as well as increase weapon and ammunition supplies for Ukraine.

However, the bigger prize is to create an EU/Nato shared R and D base for the next generation of weapon systems. And whilst nation states like to have that for themselves, this is often an expensive and high-risk area, hence much of this has been outsourced to the US defence industry. It seems that now is the time for Europe to start re-arming with a view to reducing dependence on an unreliable partner. The development of its own systems for which it has the intellectual and patent properties could have an economic benefit of kick starting that can kick start a high-tech innovation approach to economic development.

Macron, Starmer and Merz, along with Tusk and the premiers of the 3 Baltic States are providing strong leadership to support Ukraine, though much more needs to be done. But the lesson Europe needs to learn is that cannot rely on the USA to support Ukraine it needs to do that itself. And even more importantly, needs to be ready and resolute for the next attempt by Putin to test Europe, and in particular NATO members.